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The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, was a naval agreement between Britain and Germany regulating the size of the ''Kriegsmarine'' in relation to the Royal Navy. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement fixed a ratio whereby the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine was to be 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy on a permanent basis.〔Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 35–36.〕 It was registered in ''League of Nations Treaty Series'' on July 12, 1935.〔''League of Nations Treaty Series'', vol. 161, pp. 10–20.〕 The agreement was renounced by Adolf Hitler on April 28, 1939. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was an ambitious attempt on the part of both London and Berlin to reach better relations, but it ultimately foundered because of conflicting expectations between the two states. For the Germans, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was intended to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union,〔Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 37〕 whereas for the British, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was to be the beginning of a series of arms limitation agreements that were made to limit German expansionism. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was highly controversial, both at the time and since, because the 35:100 tonnage ratio allowed Germany the right to build a Navy beyond the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles, and the British had made the agreement without consulting France or Italy first. ==Background== Part IV of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had imposed severe restrictions on the size and capacities of Germany's armed forces. Germany was allowed no submarines, no naval aviation, and 6 pre-dreadnought battleships; the total naval forces allowed to the Germans were six heavy cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons displacement, six light cruisers of no more than 6,000 tons displacement, 12 destroyers of no more than 800 tonnes displacement and 12 torpedo boats.〔Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 20.〕 Through the interwar years, German opinion had protested these restrictions as harsh and unjust, and demanded that either all the other states of Europe disarm down to German levels, or, Germany be allowed to rearm to the level of all the other European states. In Britain, where after 1919 there was much guilt over the alleged excessively harsh terms of Versailles, the German claim to “equality” in armaments often met with considerable sympathy. More importantly, every German government of the Weimar Republic was implacably opposed to the terms of Versailles, and given that Germany was potentially Europe’s strongest power, from the British perspective it made sense to revise Versailles in Germany’s favor as the best way of preserving the peace.〔Gilbert, Martin ''The Roots of Appeasement'' page 57.〕 The British attitude was well summarized in a Foreign Office memo from 1935 that stated “...from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible”.〔Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany'', Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969 page 3.〕 The change of regime in Germany in 1933 did cause alarm in London, but there was considerable uncertainty about what Hitler’s long term intentions were. In August 1933, the chief of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), Royal Marine General Sir Maurice Hankey, visited Germany, and wrote down his impressions of the “New Germany” in October 1933. Hankey’s report concluded with the words: :"Are we still dealing with the Hitler of ''Mein Kampf'' , lulling his opponents to sleep with fair words to gain time to arm his people, and looking always to the day when he can throw off the mask and attack Poland? Or is it a new Hitler, who discovered the burden of responsible office, and wants to extricate himself, like many an earlier tyrant from the commitments of his irresponsible days? That is the riddle that has to be solved”.〔Document 181 C10156/2293/118 “Notes by Sir Maurice Hankey on Hitler’s External Policy in Theory and Practice October 24, 1933” from ''British Documents on Foreign Affairs'' Germany 1933 page 339.〕 This uncertainty over what Hitler’s ultimate intentions in foreign policy were was to colour much of British policy towards Germany until 1939. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Anglo-German Naval Agreement」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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